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THE LAW'S SECRETS
Gary T. Marx*
LEGAL SECRETS:

EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON

LAw. BY Kim Lane Scheppele. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. 1988. Pp. xiii, 363. Cloth, $54; paper $17.95.
Does a psychologist have a duty to disclose his patient's threat to
kill a former girlfriend? (Yes.) Can an apostate priest who fakes his
own death and then seeks employment as a professor at a Catholic
college using another name be barred from such employment? (Yes.)
Has the seller of a house who fails to inform the buyer that there is no
water between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. defrauded the buyer? (Yes.) Could a
buyer of tobacco in New Orleans in 1812 withhold his knowledge that
a peace treaty had been signed (a fact greatly increasing the price he
would otherwise have had to pay) from a seller uninformed of the
treaty? (Yes.) Eight years after treatment, can a psychiatrist publish a
book that details a patient's thoughts, feelings, and fantasies, if during
the therapy the patient consented? (No.)
In this thoughtful book based on her dissertation in sociology at
the University of Chicago, Kim Lane Scheppele1 helps us understand
why the courts allow some secrets to be kept while requiring or at least
not punishing the revelation of others.
Given the centrality of information control to social life, it is amazing that so few sociologists have studied the topic in depth. Georg
Simmel and Erving Goffman stand almost alone in devoting significant
attention to the study of secrecy. 2 Scheppele's logically and empirically persuasive study is thus very welcome. She moves the current
debate about secrets and the law beyond the realm of rhetoric and
avoids confusing what the scholar believes judges should do with what
they actually do (although in a happy coincidence it turns out that
Scheppele's morally preferred position is also best at ordering the empirical data). While bringing conceptual order and depth to a tangled
web, she shows the limited applicability of the law-and-economics approach for understanding the full range of common law secrecy cases.

* Professor of Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. B.A. 1960, U.C.L.A.;
M.A. 1962, Ph.D. 1966, University of California at Berkeley. - Ed.
1. Associate Professor of Political Science, Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, and Associ·
ate Research Scientist in the Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan.
2. E. GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTERACTION (1969); THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SJMMEL (K.
Wolff ed. 1950); see also G. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA (1988);
SECRECY (S. Tefft ed. 1980); URBAN LIFE, Jan. 1980 (special issue devoted to secrecy).
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Writing with clarity and economy of expression, she offers a model
that will certainly inspire other social researchers.
Scheppele restricts her attention to legal secrets involving contending parties whose cases come before a judge. How does Anglo-American legal culture treat such secrets? What counts as a legally
protected secret among conflicting parties? When should individuals
be compelled to reveal information to those with whom they deal? Is
there a logical order to judicial action in such cases? If so, is it best
captured by an economic view that argues that judges act to maximize
efficiency through the creation of wealth, or by a contractarian view
that stresses that judges act to create equality among contending parties? Are legal secrets also efficient secrets, as claimed by those holding the law-and-economics view?3 She bases her answers not on
deductions from first principles, or selective empirical illustration, but
on a systematic sample of nineteenth- and twentieth-century legal doctrine as expressed in common law cases. Her convincing empirical
conclusion is that "whatever else law and economics may be, it is not a
descriptively accurate positive account of law" (p. 3).
The economic theory suggests that judges will use rules to maximize efficiency. Information will be treated as private property and
secrecy viewed as a legitimate means of protecting it when such protection is believed necessary for the information to be created. However, property rights will not be extended and disclosure will be
required in those cases in which information would be produced regardless of whether or not it is protected.
The economic theory makes a distinction between casually and deliberately acquired information. For the latter, no disclosure is required. But efficiency is seen to require that information which is
casually acquired should be passed along, in spite of any other objections of its subject or the potential discloser, unless such disclosure
would make transaction costs too high. Conversational privacy
should be protected since it will increase the flow of information, while
personal privacy involving the protection of discreditable information
should not be protected, since it is believed to decrease efficiency (pp.
24-42).
In contrast to the economic theory, Scheppele develops a contractarian theory, drawing on the work of Rawls. 4 This approach
holds that law must be legitimate, beyond being merely efficient or
orderly. It is legitimate when it is able to incorporate "those values
and arguments that the losing side in a legal case would recognize as
appropriate, even when the person finds herself losing as a result of
their application" (p. 61).
3. R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Infonnation and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).
4. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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Contractarianism receives its moral power from giving individuals
choices about how to live. Scheppele asks what sort of rules individuals would likely consent to live by with respect to strategic secrets.
She suggests that the rational individual will separate secrets which
cause extensive harm from those that cause little harm (to the unknowing party) and that only the former would have to be disclosed.
In extreme cases, the "law ought to guarantee that people will not fall
below a tolerable level as a result of harm caused by secrets" (p. 74).
Individuals also will require protection from deeply held secrets which
are unresponsive to discovery efforts, since their existence is unknown.
In contrast to the law-and-economics approach, the contractarian
approach makes a central distinction between deep and shallow
secrets, a concern for equal opportunity to obtain information, and the
need to preserve trust and confidence in relationships. When the presence of a secret is not suspected, or when information can more easily
be obtained by one party than by another, disclosure should prevail.
Where secrets are known to be present, or where information can be
equally and easily acquired by either party or is closely connected to
relations of trust, disclosure will not be required. However, contractarian theory holds that if great harm would result from applying
these rules too strictly, they should be modified.
Scheppele examines the facts considered to be legally relevant in
the areas of fraud, privacy, trade secrets, and implied-warranty cases.
In developing an interpretive approach that stresses the mutually constraining impact of facts and rules, she argues that the superiority of
the economic theory of law or the contractarian theory will be determined by "which can account for the facts that are selected to be
sculpted and polished by judges" (p. 104). Scheppele argues that
judges are much more likely to notice the facts emphasized by contractarian than by economic theorists.
The book has six sections. "Framing Secrecy" (pp. 1-53) considers
the nature of secrecy and the law-and-economics view of it. "Developing a New Jurisprudence" (pp. 55-108) offers a contractarian theory of
law in which consent serves as the basis for legal morality. The next
three empirical sections seek to determine whether economic or contractarian theories best fit the data from cases involving fraud, privacy,
and implied warranty. The final section (pp. 299-320) suggests a social
theory of secrecy and further develops the contractarian theory of law.
Scheppele begins with some conceptual distinctions. Her interest
is with strategic secrets - the withholding of information tq influence
the actions or feelings of others. Such secrets are differentiated from
"private secrets" withheld simply out of a desire for personal privacy.
Scheppele views privacy as a condition of the autonomy individuals
seek and secrecy as one of several means of obtaining it. Much information withheld on privacy grounds does not have strategic purposes.
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It helps to anchor an individual's sense of identity but does not seek to
manipulate others. Conflicting interests are more clearly at stake
where strat~gic secrets are concerned and the courts are an arena for
resolving them.
There are three major forms of secrets - direct, serial, and collective. In the direct secret, A withholds something from B that B wants
to know. In the serial secret, A shares something with Band then a
third person C seeks to learn A's secret from B. In the collective or
shared secret, A and B create a secret and C seeks to learn the secret
from either party.
For these three instances there are two choices - to tell or not to
tell (the middle ground offered by the hint is ignored). This leads
Scheppele to identify six types of secrets based on the parties involved
and whether the information is revealed or concealed.
If A tells B a direct secret we have disclosure. If B tells C the serial
secret we have betrayal. If A or B reveal their shared secret to C we
have a leak. But what if the secret-keeper decides to hide the information instead? This suggests three additional types. When A hides a
direct secret from B we have a simple secret. If B withholds the serial
secret from C we have a secondhand secret. If A or B keep a collective
secret from C we have a conspiracy.
A further distinction involves whether or not the target of the secret suspects that there might be a secret. In that case we find shallow
secrets. Deep secrets refer to cases where the subject does not imagine
that relevant information might be had. The simple secret, secondhand secret, and the conspiracy have deep and shallow forms. The
depth of the secret is related to the kinds of claims which can be made
by those left out of the secret, should they ever learn of its existence.
These abstract categories help to frame the normative issues with
respect to the party's obligations to each other. There are moral and
legal justifications for and against each of the six types of secrets (disclosure, betrayal, leaks, simple secrets, secondhand secrets, and conspiracy). Scheppele's book is about how courts choose among the
conflicting justifications individuals offer for keeping or disclosing
secrets. Scheppele seeks the rules which best predict judicial behavior.
The analysis is based on two samples. The first is a representative
sample of cases still considered good law in the areas of fraud, privacy,
and trade secrets. Rather than a random sample she sought a sample
by rules. From two large legal encyclopedias which summarize American law -American Jurisprudence 2d and Corpus Juris Secundum she obtained citations for leading cases. In implied-warranty cases, in
which she sought to catch movement over time, the sample is restricted to one jurisdiction, New York, from 1796 to 1900. She laboriously went through every volume and selected all implied-warranty
cases decided by New York's highest courts.
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Regardless of their area of interest, social scientists unfamiliar with
methods of analyzing legal texts will find a useful model here. Scheppele shows how the wealth of data contained within court records can
be systematically gathered, sampled, and analyzed. She treats court
texts as narratives which can be studied to determine a normative
structure. Her very useful methodological appendix, "Studying the
Common Law: An Introduction for Social Scientists," should be
widely read by social researchers.
In general, however, the book will be of greater interest to legal
scholars concerned with doctrine than to social scientists interested in
actual behavior and consequences. This is partly a difference in what
one wishes to understand. Scheppele seeks a theory of jurisprudence
for legal secrets, while most social researchers are not content with
that. For them, the discovery of such a theory would yield a question
rather than an answer. Such researchers want to know what the nonideological causes and correlates of the theory are. Interpretations are
seen as data, not as causes, or at least not as sufficient causes. An
interpretation is something itself which can be accounted for. Instead
of viewing it as a cause, it can be viewed as a mask or as a consequence. Even with careful observation and interviewing of judges, we
can't automatically conclude that the written legitimation is in fact the
proximate cause. Interpretations may be chosen because they engender a communal gloss which justifies systematically favoring one set of
interests against another. The interpretation then is seen as a tool used
to obtain an end desired on prior grounds. We also must ask who
gains and who loses, and how do varying strategies, structures, contexts, and characteristics of the parties come into play?
In focusing on the substance of legal rules, Scheppele pays little
attention to the large body of social research which finds that legal
ideas are only one, and often not the most important, factor affecting
legal processes. Even when they are relevant (or at least present, as
with the cases Scheppele puts forth) their presence may be dependent
on factors other than the deductive rationality from first principles
which Scheppele assumes to be central.
Early in the book she makes the reader aware of the social construction of legal events: "The process of legal interpretation can be
seen as the mutual construction of facts and rules" (p. 4). A cardcarrying sociologist of knowledge could not put it better. Scheppele
seeks to understand how judges make sense of abstract norms in particular cases. She argues that both the facts of particular disputes and
the textual rules used to resolve disputes are mutually constraining.
Given this introduction, I was surprised at how little attention she
pays to elements beyond facts and rules which can also affect interpretation and outcome, as well as affect what is available to be seen as a
fact or rule. Partly this is the issue of fish not worrying much about
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the fact that they are in water, but a more macro approach looking at
the issue historically and comparatively would yield additional
insights.
I found her analysis here too mechanistic and would like to know
more about the factors (other than the substance of the doctrine and
the "facts") which condition legal behavior. How do the characteristics of the judge, court system, context, parties to the dispute (e.g.,
class, race, gender, reputation), and their attorneys (including their
strategies and tactics) affect decisions? What are the causal factors
beyond rational cognition that influence judges? What leads an aggrieved party to mobilize the law? How does the degree of deception
and withholding affect perceptions? What are the social correlates of
"rationality"? To what extent is it socially constructed as well, such
that actors with different characteristics or in different structural settings would see the same things differently? Surely the facts and rules
chosen are conditioned by more than the moral philosophy of judges
(however useful it may be to identify the most common cultural elements in such philosophies).
It is an interesting sign of the times that a scholar can tell us she is
concerned with issues of law and economics, and never once mention
Karl Marx (other than to tell us in the preface that he, along with Max
Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Georg Simmel, was trained in the law).
Surely his law-and-economics approach might also offer some ideas to
consider, even if they tum out to be empirically unsupported.
Without disputing the doctrinal coherence that Scheppele reports
finding, I would like to know what additional factors might account
for this. The relevance of rules and the degree of their applicability is
itself a variable with many correlates beyond content. Scheppele, unfortunately, pretty much ignores this. To be sure, the problem she has
defined offers much to study. Yet her account would have been much
richer had she confronted some of these additional issues as directly as
she does the current law-and-economics view. Although concern with
equal access to information is considered, a concern with other aspects
of power and social status differential~ is noticeably absent from her
treatment. It would not be difficult to create empirical tests to contrast the importance of other hypothesized causal factors such as social status differences (e.g., of the parties relative to each other), just as
she has done for the contractarian and economic views. What happens when class and doctrine pull in opposite directions? How does
class affect whether one is more likely to be the complainant or the
defendant in the various types of secrecy cases? A more varied and
interesting empirical pattern, one making greater demands on theory,
might have emerged if additional variables had been considered and if
the analysis was more grounded or situated in its social context.
We are not told much about the origins of these legal ideas, nor of
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their correlates. It is assumed that a variety of facts and rules are
available; for Scheppele, the intellectual challenge is to see which are
chosen by judges. But other analysts would not simply take these as
given, and would also ask what it is that conditions the range of facts
and rules from among which judges choose.
Her theory is clearly stated and easily grasped, and is compelling
relative to the more narrow economic view. Yet as with any account
based only on one person's analysis, I was left wondering whether
someone with a strong commitment to the economic view couldn't in
good faith give a different interpretation to the data presented here, or
emphasize other, more supportive cases. Since numbers count in both
democracy and science, I would have more confidence in Scheppele's
findings if they were based on consensus across coders and if she had
stated her method more explicitly so that others could go through the
process of checking her conclusions. Would "blind" coders, offered
the two theories and these cases, reach the same conclusions? Perhaps
they would. But the scientific grounds for her conclusions would be
stronger if she could present data from several coders, rather than just
one. In addition, it should be possible to document empirically
whether individuals do in fact subscribe to the contractarian theory in
the form that Scheppele argues. Even if judges follow it, her case for
the rootedness of this view in the preferences of individuals is based on
only one psychological study and her own reflections. There is an interesting set of issues here around the linkage between mass attitudes
and those of judicial elites.
One criteria of good scholarship is whether it leaves the reader
with questions. By this as well as other criteria this book is certainly a
success. Among the questions that this provocative work raised for
me: How well does the contractarian theory apply to rules about secrecy in other legal contexts, for example in Supreme Court or administrative decisions and legislative actions? Does it apply to judgments
about secrecy beyond the law, as in primary and secondary relationships? How well does it apply to other societies with Anglo traditions,
to Western societies and industrial societies more generally, and to
preliterate societies? Have contractarian norms become more important as industrial society has evolved and become more complex?
Have contractarian principles become more important over time, as
the limits of unrestricted capitalism become clearer and nineteenthcentury power imbalances somewhat moderated? Is the spread of contractarian principles associated with the rise of democracy? What
happens when contractarian principles conflict (e.g., compassion and
justice)? What are the implications of the development of ever more
powerful technologies for discovering information that others wish to
conceal (e.g., computer data bases, biotechnologies for truth determination, etc.)? Are these matched by ever better means of hiding information (e.g., encryption), or as such techniques become more
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widespread will legal rulings against wrongful concealment decline
(since for a larger proportion of cases it will be assumed that, with
diligence, the individual could have known)? How are the six types of
secrets that Scheppele identifies distributed across social orders and
what are their social consequences?
Scheppele examines the legal description and justification of secrets
as this involves the actions of judges in response to parties to a conflict.
Many other aspects of secrecy and the law remain to be studied from a
social science perspective. Future research work should look at things
such as the culture, social structures, functions and dysfunctions, correlates, and processes associated with secrecy such as the fourth and
fifth amendments, secret trials, grand jury and in camera proceedings,
sealed records, and protected witnesses and informers. What theories
can help us best understand the logical opposite of secrecy, as with
legally supported forms of forced disclosure such as compelled testimony, subpoenas, undercover and electronic surveillance, and laws
and policies involving informed consent and freedom of information?
Do the contractarian ideas which help us understand judicial decisionmaking in disputes also apply here, or must they be supplemented or
replaced by other approaches?
The two theories Scheppele examines have very different normative implications. The economic analysis is utilitarian. A single-end
efficiency is identified and distributive consequences are ignored. All
that matters is the total or the average, regardless of the consequences
for particular individuals. Scheppele observes:
Apart from allowing more different things to be independently valued
and not requiring the collapse of all potential goods into a single scale of
desire, the contractarian theory of law more straightforwardly embodies
those ideals that law should embody in a democracy where consent is the
basis oflegal and political obligation - namely, to be impartial (through
the concern with symmetry), compassionate (through the provision of
hedges against catastrophic loss), and just (through the triumph of principles that transcend narrow self-interest, whether of individual or
classes). In the contractarian view, the fairness of distributive outcomes
again becomes an important question for law; and individuals are not
trampled, or averaged out, for the common good. [pp. 84-85]

As the ugliness and social fallout of 1980s-style self-interest become
clearer, Scheppele's moral preference for a contractarian approach is
compelling.

